

Treasury Management and Annual Investment Strategy 2018/19

1 Introduction

1.1 Treasury management is defined as:

‘The management of the local authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks’.

1.2 The strategy covers:

- Statutory and regulatory requirements
- Balanced budget requirement
- Prudential and treasury Indicators
- Borrowing requirement
- Current treasury position
- Prospects for interest rates
- Investment policy
- Creditworthiness policy
- Country, counterparty and group exposure limits
- Cash flow and core fund investment
- Medium and long term investment
- Year end investment report
- Policy on use of external service providers.

2 Statutory and regulatory requirements

2.1 The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Council to ‘have regard to’ the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Council’s capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

2.2 The Act requires the Council to set out its Treasury Management Strategy for borrowing and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy

which sets out the Council's policies for managing its investments and for giving priority to the **security** and **liquidity** of those investments.

- 2.3 The Department of Communities and Local Government has issued revised investment guidance which came into effect from 1 April 2010. There were no major changes required over and above the changes already required by the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice 2009 (The Code of Practice).
- 2.4 The Code of Practice was adopted by this Council on 18 February 2010. In preparing this strategy due regard has also been given to the Code's 2011 revision.
- 2.5 The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:
- Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
 - Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
 - Receipt by the full Council of an Annual Treasury Management Strategy, including the Annual Investment Strategy, for the year ahead; a mid-year Review Report; and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
 - Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
 - Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of the Treasury Management Strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit Committee.
- 2.6 The scheme of delegation and role of the Section 151 officer that give effect to these requirements are set out at **[Appendix 1]**.

3 Balanced budget requirement

- 3.1 It is a statutory requirement under Section 33 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, for the Council to produce a balanced budget. In particular, Section 32 requires a local authority to calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that increases in

capital expenditure must be limited to a level whereby increases in charges to revenue from:

- increases in interest charges caused by increased borrowing to finance additional capital expenditure, and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects are limited to a level which is affordable within the projected income of the Council for the foreseeable future.

4 Prudential and treasury indicators

- 4.1 It is a statutory duty under Section 3 of the Act and supporting regulations, for the Council to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. The amount so determined is termed the 'Affordable Borrowing Limit'. In England and Wales the Authorised Limit represents the legislative limit specified in the Act.
- 4.2 The Council must have regard to the Prudential Code when setting the 'Authorised Limit', which essentially requires it to ensure that total capital investment remains within sustainable limits and, in particular, that the impact upon its future council tax levels is 'acceptable'.
- 4.3 Whilst termed an 'Affordable Borrowing Limit', the capital plans to be considered for inclusion incorporate financing by both external borrowing and other forms of liability, such as credit arrangements. The 'Authorised Limit' is to be set, on a rolling basis, for the forthcoming financial year and two successive financial years.
- 4.4 The Council is also required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The original 2001 Code was adopted on 30 September 2003 and the revised 2009 Code was adopted by the full Council on 18 February 2010. Subsequent Code amendments are also complied with.
- 4.5 Prudential and Treasury Indicators relevant to setting an integrated treasury management strategy are set out in **[Appendix 2]**.

5 Borrowing requirement

- 5.1 Other than for cash flow purposes and then within the limits set out at **[Appendix 2]** borrowing will not be necessary. All capital expenditure in 2018/19 will be funded from the Revenue Reserve for Capital Schemes, grants, developer contributions and capital receipts arising from the sale of assets.

- 5.2 The borrowing of monies purely to invest or on-lend and make a return is unlawful and this Council will not engage in such activity.

6 Current treasury position

- 6.1 The Council is debt free and as such the overall treasury position at 31 December 2017 comprised only investments which totaled £41m generating an average return of 0.63% excluding property funds.

7 Prospects for interest rates

- 7.1 The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as treasury advisor to the Council and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. **[Appendix 3]** draws together a number of current City forecasts for short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates. Link's expectation for the Bank Rate for the financial year ends (March) is:

- 2017/ 2018 0.50%
- 2018/ 2019 0.75%
- 2019/ 2020 1.00%
- 2020/ 2021 1.25%

- 7.2 As expected, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate at its meeting on 2 November. This removed the emergency cut in August 2016 after the EU referendum. The MPC also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank rate only twice more by 0.25% by 2020 to end at 1.00%. The Link Asset Services forecast as above includes increases in Bank Rate of 0.25% in November 2018, November 2019 and August 2020.

- 7.3 The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected, that at some point, there would be a more protracted move from bonds to equities after a historic long term trend, over about the last 25 years, of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial Quantitative Easing, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising bond prices. Quantitative Easing has also directly led to a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election in November 2016 has called into question whether the previous trend may go into reverse, especially now the Federal Reserve has taken the lead in reversing

monetary policy by starting, in October 2017, a policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds when they mature.

- 7.4 Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as stronger economic growth becomes more firmly established. The Fed. has started raising interest rates and this trend is expected to continue during 2018 and 2019. These increases will make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US are likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in the UK and other developed economies. However, the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong or weak the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress towards the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.
- 7.5 From time to time, gilt yields – and therefore PWLB rates - can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.
- 7.6 Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts (and MPC decisions) will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.
- 7.7 The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is probably to the downside, particularly with the current level of uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit.
- 7.8 Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:
- Bank of England monetary policy takes action too quickly over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
 - Geopolitical risks, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- Political developments in Austria and Czech Republic could provide impetus to other, particularly former Communist bloc countries, to coalesce to create a block to progress on EU integration and centralisation of EU policy. This, in turn, could spill over into impacting the Euro, EU financial policy and financial markets.
- Rising protectionism under President Trump.
- A sharp Chinese downturn and its impact on emerging market countries.

7.9 The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- UK inflation returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.
- The Federal Reserve causing a sudden shock in financial markets through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of Quantitative Easing, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.

7.10 A more detailed view of the current economic background, provided by Link, is contained in **[Appendix 4]**.

8 Investment policy

8.1 The Council's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments (the Guidance) and the CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes (the CIPFA TM Code). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, and then yield.

- 8.2 In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.
- 8.3 Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as 'credit default swaps' and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
- 8.4 Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other information relating to the banking sector in order to establish a robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
- 8.5 Investment instruments identified for use are listed in **[Appendix 5]** under 'specified' and 'non-specified' investment categories. Counterparty limits are detailed in section 10 below.

9 Creditworthiness policy

- 9.1 The creditworthiness service provided by Link has been progressively enhanced over the last few years and now uses a sophisticated modelling approach with credit ratings from all three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings are supplemented using the following overlays:
- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
 - Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings; and
 - Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.
- 9.2 This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are also used by the Council to inform the duration of an investment and are therefore referred to as

durational bands. The Council is satisfied that this service now gives a much improved level of security for its investments.

- 9.3 The selection of counterparties with a high level of creditworthiness is achieved by selecting institutions down to a minimum durational band within Link's weekly credit list of potential counterparties (worldwide). Subject to an appropriate sovereign and counterparty rating the Council uses counterparties within the following durational bands:

Yellow/Pink	5 years
Purple	2 years
Blue	1 year (nationalised or part nationalised UK Banks)
Orange	1 year
Red	6 months
Green	100 Days

- 9.4 The Council does not use the approach suggested by CIPFA of using the lowest rating from all three rating agencies to determine creditworthy counterparties. Moody's tends to be more aggressive in giving low ratings than the other two agencies and adopting the CIPFA approach may leave the Council with too few banks on its approved lending list. The Link creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and in combination with a risk weighted scoring system undue preponderance is not given to any one agency's ratings.
- 9.5 All credit ratings are reviewed weekly and monitored on a daily basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link creditworthiness service.
- If a downgrade results in the counterparty no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria its use for new investment is withdrawn immediately.
 - In addition to the use of credit ratings the Council is advised of movements in Credit Default Swap data against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis. Extreme market movements may result in a scaling back of the duration assessment or removal from the Councils lending list altogether.
- 9.6 Sole reliance is not placed on the use of the Link service. In addition the Council uses market information including information on any external support for banks to assist the decision making process.

10 Country, counterparty and group exposure limits

- 10.1 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- as determined by all three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in **[Appendix 6]**. The list will be amended in accordance with this policy should ratings change.
- 10.2 Avoidance of a concentration of investments in too few counterparties or countries is a key to effective diversification and in this regard the limits set out below are thought to achieve a prudent balance between risk and practicality.

Country, Counterparty and Group exposure	Maximum Proportion of Portfolio
UK Sovereign subject to a minimum rating of AA- .	100%
Each non-UK Sovereign rated AA- or better.	20%
Group limit excluding UK nationalised / part nationalised banks	20%
Each counterparty rated Fitch A-, F1 (green excluding CDS using Link's credit methodology) or better.	20%
Each UK nationalised or part nationalised bank / group.	20%
Each AAA multilateral / supranational bank.	20%
Each AAA rated CNAV, LNAV or VNAV money market fund.	20%
Each AAA rated enhanced cash fund / government liquidity fund / gilt fund subject to maximum 20% exposure to all such funds.	10%
Non-specified investments over 1 year duration.	60%
Each non-rated property fund used for long term investment subject to a maximum £2m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds. No limit applies to new resources made available from, or in anticipation of, the sale of existing property assets or other windfalls.	N/A
Each non-rated diversified income (multi-asset) fund used for medium term investment subject to a maximum £2m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds.	N/A

- 10.3 Cash flow balances vary depending on the timing of receipts and payments during the month and from month to month. The investment limits identified in paragraph 10.2 will be based on an estimate of the expected average daily cash flow balance at the start of the financial year augmented by core cash and other balances.

11 Cash flow and core fund investment

- 11.1 Funds available for investment are split between cash flow and core cash. Cash flow funds are generated from the collection of council tax, business rates and other income streams. They are consumed during the financial year to meet payments to precepting authorities and government (NNDR contributions) and to meet service delivery costs (benefit payments, staff salaries and suppliers in general). The consumption of cash flow funds during the course of a financial year places a natural limit on the maximum duration of investments (up to one year). Core funds comprise monies set aside in the Council's revenue and capital reserves and are generally available to invest for durations in excess of one year.
- 11.2 **Cash flow investments.** The average daily cash flow balance throughout 2018/19 is expected to be £12m with a proportion available for longer than three months. Cash flow investments will be made with reference to cash flow requirements (liquidity) and the outlook for short-term interest rates i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months. Liquidity will be maintained by using bank deposit accounts and money markets funds. Where duration can be tolerated, additional yield will be generated by utilising term deposits with banks and building societies and enhanced cash funds. Cash balances available for more than 3 months may be transferred to the core fund portfolio if a better overall return for the Council can be achieved by doing so.
- 11.3 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2018/19 a return on cash flow investments of 0.55% has been assumed.
- 11.4 **Core fund investments.** Historically the Council's core funds have been managed by an external fund manager. All core funds were returned to the Council for in-house management during 2014/15. The core fund balance is diminishing as a proportion is consumed each year (approximately £2m per annum) to support the Council's revenue budget and capital expenditure plans. The average core fund balance during 2018/19 is expected to be £15m.

- 11.5 The Council will avoid locking into longer term deals while investment rates continue their current low levels unless attractive rates are available with counterparties of particularly high creditworthiness which make longer term deals worthwhile and are within the risk parameters set by the Council.
- 11.6 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2018/19 a return on core fund investments of 0.80% has been assumed. Subject to the credit quality and exposure limits outlined in paragraph 10.2, liquidity and yield will be achieved by a mix of investments using predominantly fixed term deposits and certificates of deposit. Notice accounts and enhanced cash funds will also be used if these offer favourable returns relative to term deposits.

12 Medium and long term investment.

- 12.1 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake medium term investment in diversified income (cash, bonds, equity and property) through a collective investment scheme (fund). Investment in such schemes typically implies a 5 year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees and mitigate the impact of a fall in the value of assets under management.
- 12.2 A detailed evaluation of the funds asset quality, market risk, redemption constraints, management and governance arrangements will be undertaken in advance of any investment taking place. Any sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value separately identified.
- 12.3 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake long term investment in property through a collective investment scheme (fund). Investment in such schemes typically implies a 10 year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees. To mitigate the risk that capital values may fall due to changes in economic activity, investment duration cannot be determined with certainty at the time the investment commences. As a consequence any cash balances applied to such an investment must be available for the long term and there must be flexibility over the timing of redemption(s) in the future. Sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value separately identified.

13 Year end investment report

- 13.1 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

14 Policy on the use of external service providers

- 14.1 The Council uses Link Asset Services as its external treasury management advisors.
- 14.2 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.
- 14.3 It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

January 2018

Appendices

- 1. Treasury management scheme of delegation
- 2. Prudential and Treasury indicators
- 3. Interest rate forecasts
- 4. Economic background provided by Link Asset Services
- 5. Specified and Non-specified Investments
- 6. Approved countries for investments

Appendix 1 Treasury management scheme of delegation**Full Council**

- Budget approval.
- Approval of treasury management policy.
- Approval of the Annual Treasury Management Strategy and Annual Investment Strategy.
- Approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses, Treasury Management Policy and the Annual Treasury Management Strategy and Annual Investment Strategy.
- Approval of the treasury management outturn and mid-year reports.

Cabinet

- Budget consideration.
- Approval of Treasury Management Practices.
- Approval of the division of responsibilities.
- Approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.
- Acting on recommendations in connection with monitoring reports.

Audit Committee

- Reviewing the Annual Treasury Management Strategy and Annual Investment Strategy and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.
- Receive reports on treasury activity at regular intervals during the year and making recommendations to Cabinet.
- Reviewing treasury management policy, practices and procedures and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.

Finance, Innovation and Property Advisory Board

- Receiving budgetary control reports at regular intervals that include treasury management performance.

The S151 (responsible) officer

- Recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance.
- Submitting regular treasury management policy reports.
- Submitting budgets and budget variations.
- Receiving and reviewing management information reports.
- Reviewing the performance of the treasury management function.
- Ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function.
- Ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit.
- Recommending the appointment of external service providers.

Appendix 2 Prudential and Treasury Indicators

The prudential indicators relating to capital expenditure cannot be set until the capital programme is finally determined and will as a consequence be reported as part of the Setting the Budget for 2018/19 report that is to be submitted to Cabinet on 8 February 2018.

The treasury management indicators are as set out in the table below:

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	Actual	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Authorised Limit for external debt :					
borrowing	Nil	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
other long term liabilities	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
TOTAL	Nil	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Operational Boundary for external debt:-					
borrowing	Nil	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
other long term liabilities	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
TOTAL	Nil	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Actual external debt	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure > 1 year at year end	Nil	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 0% to 60%			
Upper limit for variable rate exposure < 1 year at year end	13,098 (43.5%)	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 40% to 100%			
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 364 days at year end	Nil (0%)	60% of funds			

Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing during 2016/17 - 2020/21	upper limit	lower limit
under 12 months	100 %	0 %
Over 12 months	0 %	0 %

Appendix 3 Interest Rate Forecasts – December 2017

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View														
	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate View	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%
3 Month LIBID	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.70%	0.90%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.20%	1.20%
6 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.30%	1.30%	1.40%
12 Month LIBID	0.70%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.10%	1.30%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB Rate	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
Bank Rate														
Link Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
Capital Economics	1.70%	1.90%	2.30%	2.60%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
Capital Economics	2.30%	2.60%	2.80%	3.10%	3.30%	3.30%	3.30%	3.30%	3.30%	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
Capital Economics	2.95%	3.15%	3.45%	3.65%	3.90%	3.90%	3.90%	3.90%	3.90%	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
Capital Economics	2.80%	3.10%	3.30%	3.60%	3.80%	3.80%	3.80%	3.80%	3.80%	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix 4 Economic Background Provided by Link Asset Services

GLOBAL OUTLOOK. World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this. The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution**.

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently, in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In

particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, nor let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income**, which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift UP in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action.

On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.

- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UK. After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.3% (+1.8% y/y), quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.5% y/y) and quarter 3 was +0.4% (+1.5% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting. (Inflation actually came in at 3.0% in both September and October so that might prove now to be the peak.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare**

capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017

warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 -34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **some consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate in the coming years. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually unfold.

EZ. Economic growth in the Eurozone (EZ), (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.6% in quarter 1 (2.0% y/y), 0.7% in quarter 2 (2.3% y/y) and +0.6% in quarter 3 (2.5% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in October inflation was 1.4%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has, however, announced that it will slow down its monthly QE purchases of debt from €60bn to €30bn from January 2018 and continue to at least September 2018.

USA. Growth in the American economy was notably erratic and volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1% and quarter 3 coming in at 3.0%. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.1%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed. has started on a gradual upswing in rates with four increases in all and three increases since December 2016; and there could be one more rate rise in 2017, which would then lift the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four increases in 2018. At its September meeting, the Fed. said it would start in October to gradually

unwind its \$4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50.
- March 2019: initial two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. In her Florence speech in September 2017, the Prime Minister proposed a two year transitional period after March 2019.
- UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy will leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the two year transitional period.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.

Appendix 5 Specified and Non-specified Investments

All specified and non-specified Investments will be:

Subject to the sovereign, counterparty and group exposure limits identified in the Annual Investment Strategy.

Subject to the duration limit suggested by Link (+6 months for UK Financial Institutions) at the time each investment is placed.

Subject to a maximum of 60% of funds being held in non-specified investments at any one time.

Sterling denominated.

Specified Investments (maturities up to 1 year):

investment	Minimum Credit Criteria
UK Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	UK Sovereign AA-
Term deposits - UK local authorities	UK Sovereign AA-
Term deposits - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-
Term deposits - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 or Green excluding CDS
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-
Certificates of deposit - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1, or Green excluding CDS
UK Treasury Bills	UK Sovereign AA-
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign AA-
Bonds issued by multi-lateral development banks	AAA
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt)	AAA
Money Market Funds (CNAV, LNAV or VNAV)	AAA
Enhanced Cash and Government Liquidity Funds	AAA

Non-specified Investments (maturities in excess of 1 year and any maturity if not included above):

Investment	Minimum Credit Criteria	Max duration to maturity
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-	2 years
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Term deposits - local authorities	UK Sovereign AA-	2 years
Term deposits - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-	2 years
Term deposits – banks, building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1(Green)	2 years
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-	2 years
Certificates of deposit – banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Commercial paper - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-	2 years
Commercial paper - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Floating rate notes issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	5 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	5 years
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK Government)	AAA	5 years
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign AA-	25% 5 years
Property Funds	N/A	N/A
Diversified Income Funds	N/A	N/A

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

Appendix 6 Approved countries for investments

All counterparties in addition to meeting the minimum credit criteria specified in the Annual Investment Strategy must be regulated by a sovereign rated as a minimum AA- by each of the three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's.

This list will be reviewed and amended if appropriate on a weekly basis by the Director of Finance and Transformation.

As of 31 December 2017 sovereigns meeting the above requirement which also have banks operating in sterling markets with credit ratings of green or above on the Link Asset Services' Credit Worthiness List were:

AAA	Australia Canada Denmark Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Singapore Sweden Switzerland
AA+	Finland Hong Kong USA
AA	Abu Dhabi (UAE) France UK
AA-	Belgium Qatar